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Opting Out of an Ever Closer Union:
The Integration Doxa and the
Management of Sovereignty1
REBECCA ADLER-NISSEN
How is sovereignty managed in the EU? This article investigates the relationship
between sovereignty and European integration through the prism of national opt-outs
from EU treaties, addressing an apparent contradiction in contemporary European
governance: the contrasting processes of integration and diﬀerentiation. On the one
hand, European integration is increasing as states transfer sovereign competencies to
the EU. On the other hand, we see a multitude of diﬀerentiation processes through
which member states choose to disengage from the EU polity by negotiating exemptions
or derogations. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s political sociology, the article argues that
to understand how sovereignty is interpreted and exercised in the EU, it is necessary to
focus not only on the constitutive and regulative dimensions of sovereignty, but equally
on the practice dimension. This entails an exploration of how sovereignty claims are
managed in a particular social setting. Rather than seeing opt-outs as classic
instruments of international law, accentuating the member states’ unchanged
sovereignty, the article argues that the management of the British and Danish opt-
outs quite paradoxically expresses the strength of the doxa of European integration, i.e.
the notion of ‘an ever closer union’.
As the EU has moved into areas previously reserved for the nation-state, the
image of the EU as a slippery slope has become more prevalent in public
debates across Europe. In the face of what is depicted as a quasi-automatic
integration process, some states seek to reclaim sovereignty. During the past
two decades, doubts over the beneﬁts of Union membership have given rise
to controversial national opt-outs (exemptions) from EU treaties, which
indicate that ‘outsiderness’ may be preferred to being a full member of the
Union. Most recently, in the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty, the UK,
Poland and the Czech Republic secured exemptions from the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. These reservations are recent examples of a general
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trend where states seek to formally secure national sovereignty through
instruments of diﬀerentiated integration.
Existing research has largely interpreted opt-outs from EU treaties as
safeguards of member state sovereignty (Wallace 1997, Hansen 2002,
Moravcsik 1998). In consequence of this reading, national opt-outs are
generally perceived as controversial, leading to dangerous fragmentation of
the EU. In this article, I propose a diﬀerent interpretation: opt-outs
demonstrate the diﬃculty of safeguarding sovereignty in the context of
European integration. I illustrate this claim by examining a particular form
of diﬀerentiated integration, namely the British and Danish opt-outs from
the euro and justice and home aﬀairs. When the other member states
conceded opt-outs to the UK and Denmark to avoid a stalemate in treaty
negotiations, they helped preserve the symbolic ﬁgure of an autonomous
state. This article demonstrates, however, that the opt-out protocols are
managed pragmatically in ways that contradict their original meaning.
Building on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, the article argues that the
management of the British and Danish opt-outs quite paradoxically conveys
the strength of the doxa of European integration, i.e. the notion of ‘an ever
closer union’. In fact, the management of opt-outs reﬂects a retreat from
national sovereignty rather than an expression of it. By examining how
claims to sovereignty are managed in practice, attention is drawn to the
minutiae of day-to-day international politics such as diplomatic negotia-
tions. It is often through such mundane aspects of European integration
that we encounter what is otherwise an entirely abstract phenomenon,
reiﬁed with the label ‘the state’. As this article seeks to demonstrate, a
political sociological approach to integration provides a more nuanced
account of the varied consequences of European integration for sovereign
statehood than the dominant discourses of ‘post-sovereignty’ (Keating 2004)
or ‘multi-level governance’ (Hix 1998) can do, prioritising, as they so often
do, formal institutions over social agency.
The article is divided into six sections. I begin by brieﬂy introducing the
British and Danish opt-outs and the ideas of national autonomy that
motivated them. This is followed by a critical review of existing
interpretations of the relationship between diﬀerentiated integration and
sovereignty. The third section of the article proposes a distinction between
the constitutive, regulative and practice dimensions of sovereignty. The
fourth section clariﬁes the article’s scope and methodology. The ﬁfth section
examines the practice dimension of sovereignty by analysing the actual
management of the British and Danish opt-outs from the euro, common
borders and justice and home aﬀairs. The sixth and ﬁnal section discusses
how these insights require a rethinking of some of the established
assumptions regarding the relationship between sovereignty and European
integration. Opt-outs have not led to a safeguarding of sovereignty in the
way that scholars have otherwise expected. Sovereignty is still relevant as a
concept to understand European integration, but when reduced to its
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constitutive and regulative functions, we lose sight of the important ways in
which integration challenges claims to sovereignty.
Opting Out to Safeguard Sovereignty
‘In actual fact, opt-outs constitute a de facto negation of the idea of European
cooperation’ (Verhofstadt 2006: 214). Former Belgian Prime Minister Guy
Verhofstadt does notmince his words in his bookTheUnited States of Europe.
However, this convinced European does not stand alone with this view. In
both political and academic debates, national opt-outs from EU treaties are
generally thought to lead to a dangerous fragmentation of the EU. When the
Maastricht Treaty (1992) granted substantial opt-outs to the UK and
Denmark, legal scholars argued that it would lead to a ‘Europe of bits and
pieces’ (Curtin 1993) and political scientists predicted a destructive
disintegration of the EU (see Andersen and Sitter 2006). Nevertheless, the
details of what kind of sovereignty – if any – is safeguarded when a member
state opts out has, surprisingly, remained relatively uncharted territory over
the years. In the following, I will argue that the British and Danish opt-outs
oﬀer a crucial example of how the EU controls diﬀerentiated integration.
National opt-outs and other instruments of diﬀerentiation are likely to be
used much more as the Union expands geographically, continues to
introduce new policies, and struggles with eurosceptic populations. Opt-outs
are far from technical questions; they postulate that it is possible to
(re)constitute the state boundary and still be part of the EU. They draw a
symbolic, legal and political line in the sand, as it were, and establish an area
where the state is to remain sovereign.2
With the Maastricht Treaty, the EU advanced ambitious aspirations of
creating a common currency, eliminating national border controls and
introducing common asylum and immigration policies as well as Union
citizenship and a common foreign policy. Two states, the UK and Denmark,
were particularly reluctant to surrender authority in these areas and came
close to wrecking the Treaty. The domestic political debates in both the UK
and Denmark revolved around the undermining of national identity and the
surrendering of control over daily lives to faceless foreign bureaucrats. A
range of speciﬁc issues were grouped under the banner of sovereignty,
including the fear of an army of federal armed forces, the presence of foreign
police oﬃcers on Danish or British territory, the application of EU law to
sensitive questions of criminal justice, a common currency, the perception of
a self-amending treaty, the enhanced role of the European Parliament and
EU citizenship (Hansen 2002).
With Maastricht, the UK was accorded an opt-out clause, allowing the
country to refrain from adopting the single currency.3 Furthermore, the UK
negotiated an opt-out from the so-called Social Chapter.4 These opt-out
clauses were one of the conditions to be met if the British government were
to give its approval to the treaty as a whole. The opt-outs were drafted to
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assure that the treaty was in line with a British conception of Europe which
did not challenge British constitutional institutions and conventions such as
parliamentary sovereignty (Hansen and Scholl 2002: 4). With the
Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the UK was granted an opt-out from the
Schengen agreement (abolishing controls and checks at national borders
between EU member states) and a ﬂexible opt-in possibility relating to Title
IV TEC dealing with ‘visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related
to free movement of persons’.
Denmark was also a reluctant negotiator in Maastricht. Having been
granted a protocol on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the
Danish government had accepted the treaty, but it was rejected by the
Danish population in a referendum held in June 1992. The Danish ‘nej’ and
the narrow French ‘oui’ came as a shock to the leaders of the EU and
contributed to a dramatic ratiﬁcation crisis. It became clear that the
European populations no longer just accepted or ignored integration. In
Weiler’s words, the Maastricht crisis was ‘the beginning or end of a deeper
process of mutation in public ethos or societal self-understanding (Weiler
1999: 3). Whether or not one accepts the rejection and ratiﬁcation crisis of
the Maastricht Treaty as a ‘constitutional moment’ (Weiler 1999: 3), the so-
called permissive consensus appeared to be a thing of the past.
Following the referendum, the Danish Parliament drafted a common
negotiating position for the government. It focused on the most dominant
issue in the Danish referendum debate: the transfer of national sovereignty
to the EU. Denmark managed to attach four key reservations to the treaties:
Denmark would not adopt the euro; European citizenship would not replace
national citizenship; Denmark would not participate in the development of
a common European defence; and, ﬁnally, Denmark would not participate
in supranational justice and home aﬀairs cooperation.
In this article, I focus particularly on the controversial British and Danish
protocols on the euro, common borders, and justice and home aﬀairs. In
popular debate, opt-outs constitute bulwarks against European integration
and represent the preservation of national sovereignty, underpinning an
image of the state with full political and legal authority over people,
territory and currency. However, little is known of how opt-outs are
managed in the rapidly growing policy areas in which both countries have –
apparently – chosen to surrender inﬂuence in order to safeguard national
sovereignty. Is Guy Verhofstadt in fact right when he claims that national
opt-outs preserve sovereignty? Are opt-outs a ‘negation of European
integration’? Or are they an expression of a pragmatic way of integrating
states, a testimony to the sui generis nature of the Union?
A Crucial Case of Diﬀerentiation
The British and Danish opt-outs are perceived as the most controversial and
high-proﬁle protocols in the EU. By high-proﬁle, I mean that a continuum
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of opt-outs exists ranging from the more substantial and debated opt-outs
from major policy areas such as the EMU, Schengen or the common
security and defence policy to the relatively uncontroversial protocols on
reindeer husbandry, the acquisition of second homes or Swedish chewing
tobacco (‘snus’). These protocols have a limited eﬀect and do not threaten
the cohesion of the Union.5
The British and Danish opt-outs, however, appear to ﬂy in the face of the
very idea of an ever closer union. They present us with a ‘most-likely case’: if
opt-outs safeguard national sovereignty and threaten integration, it is most
likely to show in the British and Danish cases. On the other hand, if British
and Danish national exemptions are eroded, we have reason to question the
dominant assumption that such claims to sovereignty endanger the
integration process.
In EU studies, diﬀerentiation is the collective term used for the movement
away from common rules towards a form of cooperation where diﬀerent
member states have diﬀerent rights and obligations within speciﬁc policy
areas (Ko¨lliker 2006: 2). Opt-outs are currently an established part of the
European cooperation, while enhanced cooperation – in its formal, treaty-
speciﬁed form – has only been applied once for divorce rules in 2010. In
addition, there are numerous examples of informal, enhanced cooperation
in the form of breakaway groups of member states that have cooperated
more closely outside of the treaties. This article focuses only on treaty-based
opt-outs, demonstrating that existing EU scholarship, particularly of the
legal variety, tends to overstate the disintegrating consequences of
diﬀerentiation.
Due to the legal and political complexity of the policy areas of the EMU,
justice and home aﬀairs, it is no mean task to provide a systematic overview
of the byzantine British/Danish protocols. This article will not cover the
entire development of the areas, but rather focus on the ways in which opt-
outs – as symbols of sovereignty – are managed in practice, thus questioning
established assumptions about the relationship between sovereignty and
integration.
Highjacking the EU’s Legal Order?
The introduction of the British and Danish opt-outs seemed to strengthen
the liberal intergovernmentalist argument that the EU was still driven by the
member states and their concern to preserve national autonomy (Gsto¨hl
2000: 46). Ko¨lliker (2001; 2006) explained the prevalence of diﬀerentiated
integration more generally by arguing that if we assume that states are
unitary rational actors acting according to calculated costs and beneﬁts, we
may use public goods theory to uncover ‘the logic of diﬀerentiated
European integration’. This logic implies that the character of goods
produced in a policy area determines whether opt-opts from a policy area
are likely to create permanent or preliminary divisions between the member
1096 R. Adler-Nissen
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states. While Ko¨lliker avoids the question of sovereignty, he essentially
argues that the long-term consequences of any instance of diﬀerentiated
integration depend on the nature of the ‘good’ (security, money,
information etc.) that it aims to generate. Some goods have ‘centrifugal’
eﬀects and others have ‘centripetal’ eﬀects.
Legal commentators generally avoid such pragmatic assessments. Instead,
they argue that major national opt-outs undermine the uniﬁed EU legal
order, or constitutional system, and erode the solidarity between member
states. Curtin (1993: 88) described the British and Danish opt-outs from the
Maastricht Treaty as a ‘hijacking’ of the acquis communautaire. Opt-outs
represent a threat to the uniform application of EU law (de Bu´rca and Scott
2000; Curtin 1993; Hine 2001). To understand why EU opt-outs are seen as
deeply problematic, one must consider the self-understanding of many EU
lawyers. As Walker (2003: 12–13) notes:
there is a signiﬁcant strain of EU scholarship which for reasons of
intellectual training, professional socialisation and associated norma-
tive commitments is minded to embrace the oﬃcial constitutional
perspective and object-language of the EU as its own, and to develop
the best sense and best defence of those of the ECJ’s various doctrines
of constitutional self-assertion – not just supremacy but also direct
eﬀect, implied powers etc. – which seem to embrace and conﬁrm a
sovereignist self-understanding.
This ‘sovereignist self-understanding’ implies that the Community’s legal
order is supreme and independent from national constitutions. Accord-
ingly, opt-outs represent less a national claim to sovereignty and more a
threat to the EU’s own claims to authority, i.e. ‘its own claim to
sovereign authority within a limited sphere’ (Walker 1999: 18). Indeed, it
appears as though scholars who defend the EU’s legal order against opt-
outs are guided not just by analytical considerations and positivist legal
method, but also by this particular (self-)understanding or normative
concern for the telos of the integrative process and the EU’s own claims
to supreme authority.
On the other side of the fence are those who believe that one should not
buy into traditional assumptions concerning the problems of opting out vis-
a`-vis the unity of EU’s legal order. Instead, these scholars celebrate
diﬀerentiated integration and opt-outs as a means of developing new modes
of governance that might even strengthen democracy in the EU. From the
pro-diﬀerentiation perspective, sovereignty is not a question of either–or,
but rather a question of both–and. These scholars assume that neither the
state nor the EU possesses ultimate supreme authority. In this light, opt-
outs represent an integral aspect of the ‘post-sovereign’ (MacCormick 2002)
perspective in which sovereignty is shared, dispersed and disaggregated. The
pro-diﬀerentiation camp calls for a pragmatic approach to EU law that
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accommodates the dynamics of integration and disintegration within the EU
legal order (Dehousse 2003; Shaw 1996).
This camp of legal scholarship is joined by a diverse group of political and
social scientists who are enthusiastic about the perspective of diﬀerentiated
integration, albeit for diﬀerent reasons (e.g. Delanty and Rumford 2006;
Habermas 2003; Schmitter 2001). This camp includes the multi-level
governance approach where the state is but one of many actors in a
multi-dimensional order (Warleigh 2002; Hix 1998).
A normative position emerges from such ideas. It presents a positive
interpretation of the partly unsuccessful attempts to create a harmonious
and uniﬁed legal and political order in the EU (Dehousse 2003): Opt-outs do
not constitute a threat, but rather an inevitable, perhaps even promising
avenue for the future of the EU. Thus, while the orthodox anti-
diﬀerentiation camp sees opt-outs as expressions of national sovereignty,
the pragmatic pro-diﬀerentiation camp perceives them as part of a process
whereby authority relationships become more complex and sovereign power
more dispersed within the EU (Bellamy and Castiglione 2003: 19).
Notwithstanding their disagreements on whether opt-outs are harmful or
helpful, both camps agree that diﬀerentiated integration challenges the
symbolic capacity of EU law as an independent source of power and means
of constructing an authoritative image and discourse of the political order
and cultural community it seeks to represent (Walker 1999: 6–7). Yet the
argument that opt-outs challenge the symbolic authority of the EU legal and
political order and its sovereignist self-understanding has yet to be
demonstrated in a more detailed analysis. The remainder of this article
will argue that contrary to the claims of both the anti- and pro-
diﬀerentiation camps, the unity vision of the EU remains fundamentally
unchallenged by the British and Danish opt-outs. The concept of
sovereignty is still relevant for the study of European integration, but
perhaps just as much at EU level as at national level.
The Practice Dimension of Sovereignty and the Integration Doxa
The majority of eﬀorts made by scholars to understand cooperation in
the EU reﬂect top-down applications of analytic frameworks to existing
case material. Typically, such readings suggest that an opt-out is a
relatively stable legal arrangement or collective identity position in the
EU. At ﬁrst glance, a national opt-out is quite simply a legal protocol,
attached to a treaty, which usually implies that a member state will not
formally participate in the decision-making process and will not adopt or
implement EU legislation in the area covered by the opt-out. Yet
sovereignty claims cannot be understood on the basis of formal rules
alone, or even on the basis of the various legal interpretations of these
rules. Identities and social contexts will always modify the implications of
rules.
1098 R. Adler-Nissen
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Rather than assuming that protocols have automatic eﬀects, I wish to
explore the practice dimension of sovereignty through an analysis which is
more closely related to the social setting in which the opt-outs are managed.
Sovereign claims, I argue, gain practical meaning – and consequences – in
everyday negotiations between state and government elites in Brussels. To
further this argument, the article draws on the recent ‘practice turn’ in
International Relations (IR) theory. Within IR, the practice turn has been
promoted by scholars such as Iver B. Neumann (2002) and Vincent Pouliot
(2007). They build on the work of Bourdieu (e.g. 1977) and Giddens (e.g.
1986) who in diﬀerent ways have insisted on the mutually constituted
relationship between social structure and social action.
By focusing on the practice dimension of sovereignty one does not neglect
sovereignty as a fundamental institution or ignore its epistemic function as a
way of knowing and ordering the world. Rather, what I suggest is that
abstract notions of sovereignty need to be supplemented by perspectives on
how this concept is played out in practice. This may become clearer if we
consider the double character of sovereignty, which involves both a
constitutive and a regulative dimension. Sovereignty constitutes the state
system as the ‘meta-political authority in world politics’ (Thomson 1995:
214). But once this constitution has taken place, or rather is taken for
granted, sovereignty also functions as a framework of action, regulating
international relations and law. In the spheres of international and EU law
and politics, this regulative dimension manifests itself in a multitude of
explicit and implicit rules for the entitlement and constraints of sovereigns.
This is the double character of sovereignty. However, apart from its
constitutive and regulative dimensions, sovereignty also has a practical
dimension: It is maintained through political, legal and social practices.
Sovereignty as a claim to supreme authority becomes part of daily
diplomatic struggles, which often occur under the radar of both public
and academic attention. The three dimensions of sovereignty are inter-
related, but they have relative autonomy.
To understand the practice dimension of sovereignty, one needs to study
the way in which pragmatic concerns aﬀect claims to sovereignty, and
examine how these claims are handled on a day-to-day basis, inﬂuenced, as
they are, by tacit understandings of legitimate and appropriate action in
particular social contexts. An analysis of the tacit understandings shared by
the politico-administrative elites in the EU institutions and member states
provide a key to understanding the complex relationship between
sovereignty and European integration. A tacit understanding operating as
if it were an objective ‘truth’ constitutes what Bourdieu would call doxa,
which is the undisputed and taken-for-granted premise for social interaction
in a particular ﬁeld (Bourdieu 1977: 164).
The idea that Europe must continue to move forward is a shared
assumption – or doxa – that is very rarely questioned by any national or
EU oﬃcial during negotiations. One of the most important ways in which
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the EU moves forward is through law. When the states became EU
members, ‘they also implicitly signed up for more integration, because –
in EC rhetoric – law (and obedience to law) has traditionally meant
integration’ (Shaw 1996: 237). With some variations, the doxa of
European integration is captured in the preamble of the Treaty of
Rome, which states that the gathering nations of Europe are ‘determined
to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe’. Indeed, the acquis communautaire has been interpreted as more
than the legal provisions, procedures and rules of the Treaty of European
Union; it has been perceived as ‘an embedded acquis’, or ‘an institution
which forms part of an ongoing process of constructing meaning and
applying knowledge’ (Wiener 1998: 302). The doxa of ‘an ever closer
union’ serves to legitimise the EU’s actions to its own civil servants in the
Commission as well as to the national representatives when they
negotiate in Brussels.
Helen Wallace’s (2000: 33) description of cooperation in justice and home
aﬀairs as ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ provides an idea of the
integrated and sheltered nature of European cooperation. The term
indicates that EU cooperation gives pre-eminence to state representatives
but simultaneously allows for the development of common policies in an
atmosphere of mutual responsiveness. The transgovernmental method of
policy-making is diﬀerent from the intergovernmental mode. In transgo-
vernmental cooperation government actors such as ministerial oﬃcials and
law enforcement agencies have relatively autonomous decision-making
functions (Lavenex 2006). A British national expert seconded to the
European Commission describes the atmosphere of the High Level Working
Group on Migration and Asylum in the following way:
It is very cooperative. Occasionally we have, for example, the
representative from Malta saying why is all the attention on the West
African states when we on our tiny island get hundreds of people a
day? They make a lot of noise and then we try to help and what more
can we do? But certainly it’s very cooperative, and generally everyone
is working towards the same agenda, and we agree on the same ideas
about creating a common policy.6
The metaphor of movement is striking: ‘Everyone is working towards the
same agenda’, she says. This illustrates that negotiations are orientated
towards developing and building a common policy, and, at the same time,
representing nationally deﬁned agendas and priorities. Interestingly, this
does not mean that concepts of sovereignty and national interest become
irrelevant, but rather that they are interpreted and reinterpreted in the
diplomatic ﬁeld. According to a young British diplomat in the UK
Permanent Representation: ‘Brussels does something to you. I think of
the oﬃcials from the other member states as my colleagues; they are not
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opponents, although of course sometimes we have to defend diﬀerent
interests’.7
Building on this understanding, European integration can be seen as a
social process driven by politico-administrative elites working within a
speciﬁc and relatively narrow understanding of possible political positions
and ideas. This is a ‘bottom-up’ approach to European integration because
it begins by looking at the face-to-face interactions between individuals and
groups negotiating on behalf of their states or the EU institutions. From this
perspective, sovereignty and the way it has been translated into particular
legal and political agreements with other states is continuously constructed
and reconstructed by the agents that represent the state.
Indeed, managing claims to sovereignty is not a neutral exercise; it is a
process of translation and modiﬁcation of meaning. In the quest for
European unity and constitution-building, diﬀerentiated integration is an
unwanted obstacle. To conform to the expectations of EU institutions and
other member states and to advance ‘practical solutions’,8 British and
Danish oﬃcials seek to reduce the exclusionary eﬀects of the opt-outs to
ensure that they act as credible partners and gain inﬂuence on the European
decision-making process. In doing so, they articulate the formal exemptions
as temporary measures that are not aimed at reducing the consistency of the
EU acquis. In the following section, I will explore how this is played out in
relation to the euro and justice and home aﬀairs.
Following a Bourdieusian approach, I seek to reconstruct the practical
experience that is bound up with managing sovereignty. The analysis focuses
on the day-to-day reinterpretation and management of the opt-outs by
British and Danish oﬃcials. I pursue a methodological strategy that
combines diﬀerent types of qualitative data: semi-structured interviews and
oﬃcial material (EU treaties, parliamentary debates etc.). There are two
reasons for doing qualitative interviews: ﬁrstly, I am interested in how
oﬃcials handle the opt-outs on a daily basis. Secondly, there is very little
written material on the opt-outs, as their daily management is primarily
based on tacit procedures. I have conducted 123 semi-structured, in-depth
interviews with oﬃcials from the UK, Denmark and 11 other states as well
as representatives from the European Commission and the Council of
Ministers secretariat.
‘Keep the Pound’
Monetary autonomy has clearly diminished as a result of the integration of
the world’s capital markets. Nonetheless, widespread slogans such as ‘keep
the pound’ or ‘bevar kronen’ reveal that in the UK and Denmark money is
closely associated with popular understandings of sovereignty. In both
countries, the minting of coins and printing of paper money are
(still) regarded as ‘sovereignty-producing practices’ (Doty 1996: 143).
Despite continued attempts by the British and Danish governments to
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‘de-sovereignise’ the euro, and regardless of the increasing diﬃculties of
imagining and practising monetary autonomy in a globalised world, the UK
and the Danish euro protocols represent symbolic contracts between
government and people in which the latter is promised ultimate (and
sovereign) decision-making powers qua the referendum guarantee.
The UK has a particular doctrine of national sovereignty in monetary
aﬀairs; it is centred on ideas of domestic political control with the monetary
instrument (Gamble and Kelly 2002). Indeed, the UK has been granted a
protocol on the single currency, which guarantees that only the UK
government and parliament may initiate procedures for adopting the euro.
Furthermore, the UK is not subject to the provisions on excessive deﬁcits and
it is not part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) or the
European Central Bank (ECB). With the election of a pro-euro Labour
government in 1997, this ﬁrm position was forged into a ‘prepare and decide’
policy based on ﬁve economic tests, which must be met before any decision to
join can be made (Miles and Doherty 2005: 101). However, the Labour
government’s attempt to present the euro as merely a question of economic
calculations has not proved eﬀective. Parliament and the eurosceptic media
have established a discursive consensus that the euro is one of the major
political questions related to the fate of the UK as a sovereign state (Risse
2003; Howarth 2007). Consequently, to further reassure an anxious British
public and avoid a diﬃcult debate, the former Labour government promised
that a decision to recommend joining the euro zone should not only be put to a
vote in parliament, but also a referendum. In light of the ﬁnancial crisis and the
euro zone’s current trouble, Conservative PrimeMinister David Cameron has
celebratedBritish euro-outsiderness and stressed thatBritain rejects any treaty
changes thatwould result in a ‘transfer of power fromWestminster toBrussels’
(The Guardian, 21 May 2010).
Meanwhile on the European scene, the UK has followed a strategy of
‘economic and political hitchhiking’ (Miles and Doherty 2005: 16). The
British government has actively followed the developments of the monetary
policy development in the EU despite the British opt-out. The Treasury
established a Euro Preparations Unit in 1997 to prepare the diﬀerent parts
of the UK economy to manage a changeover to the euro. With the arrival of
the Conservative–Liberal Democrat government in May 2010, Chancellor
George Osborne announced to chuckles in the House of Commons that he
had abolished the Treasury’s Euro Preparations Unit. ‘Yes, one does exist,
and the oﬃcials concerned have been redeployed to more productive
activities’, as he put it.9 One might add that the productive potential of the
Euro Preparations Unit lies more in what it says about the tensions in
British sovereignty management. Although Treasury oﬃcials admit that this
was essentially only window dressing, initiated to send the right signals to
Brussels and build up credibility around the government’s ‘prepare and
decide’ policy, substantial institutional reforms have, in fact, been
introduced.10
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The decision over monetary sovereignty has been shared with the
population through the promise to hold a referendum. Simultaneously,
however, the Bank of England has gained its formal independence from
parliament with the ‘Bank of England Act’ in 1998. This institutional
change brought the UK more or less into line with the practice of those
states which were planning to adopt the euro at the outset. It primarily
reﬂected an adjustment in the conception of how monetary matters should
be governed and had less to do with preparations for joining the euro.
However, by removing monetary policy from the competences of parlia-
ment, the act challenges elements of the original ideological foundation of
the euro opt-out. In the light of these contradictory moves, one could argue
that the UK euro opt-out and the ‘prepare and decide’ policy has not
guaranteed the continuation – but has supported the transformation – of the
domestic doctrine on monetary sovereignty.
The Danish exemption from the euro formally leaves the choice to join
the euro zone with the Danish people because it guarantees a referendum for
adopting the euro. At the end of the 1990s, a clear majority among
Denmark’s mainstream political parties favoured euro adoption and began
to prepare the Danes for the single currency. During the campaign leading
up to the referendum, the then Social Democratic government claimed that
a ‘yes’ to the Euro was sound business policy and stressed the importance of
‘a place at the table’ at the Governing Council of the ECB (Marcussen and
Zolner 2001). In May 2000, as opinion polls began to show falling support
for the euro, former Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen desperately
attempted to appease doubters by asserting that Denmark could join the
euro zone and withdraw at a later date if the Danish population wished to
do so. This was obviously an attempt to ensure the Danes that Danish
sovereignty would be fundamentally untouched by the decision to surrender
the opt-out, that sovereignty could be reclaimed, so to speak. However,
Nyrup Rasmussen’s statement gave rise to much confusion when it was
contradicted by Commission President Romano Prodi, who said that
joining the EMU was ‘by deﬁnition permanent’, thereby aﬃrming the
constitutional character of the EU treaties and the principle of solidarity.
Mr Prodi later suggested that from a political point of view, Prime Minister
Nyrup Rasmussen’s assertion was correct, but there were no treaty
provisions for joining and leaving the EMU (Miller 2000: 15). The
government’s appeasement strategy did not work, 53.1 per cent of the
Danish voters rejected the euro against 46.9 per cent who voted in favour.
The 2000 referendum put a lid on the debate on the euro in Denmark.
Meanwhile, shifting governments and their oﬃcials still see the euro opt-out
as detrimental to national interests.
To the rest of Europe, however, Denmark has long been a quasi-euro
member. Even in periods when the euro zone has faced ﬁnancial and
economic problems, Denmark’s monetary policy remains the ﬁxed-
exchange-rate policy vis-a`-vis the euro. The Danish Central Bank follows
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the ECB’s ‘sound policy’ to the letter, and Denmark has remained well
within the constraints implied by the Stability and Growth Pact.
Furthermore, the Danish government and oﬃcials hope to compensate
for their ‘outsiderness’ by being extra constructive.11 From a Brussels
perspective, there is not much autonomy or ‘outsiderness’ to be traced in the
Danish euro position.
Opting into Justice and Home Aﬀairs
For many years, European states were cautious not to let the EU inﬂuence
policies on asylum, immigration, border control, and police and criminal
law. Until the end of the 1990s, it was unthinkable that British and
Slovenian police oﬃcers would be working together in Europol’s head-
quarters in Den Haag, investigating child pornography networks; that the
EU would have an agency in Warsaw responsible for coordinating common
border control; or that authorities in one member state would extradite
presumed criminals at the demand of another member state. With the
Amsterdam Treaty, the member states cemented their wish to further
integrate their asylum, immigration, border control and civil law policies.
While national sovereignty may still be an important concern, cooperation
in justice and home aﬀairs has shifted from taboo to totem.
Simultaneous with the intensiﬁcation of cooperation on justice and home
aﬀairs since Amsterdam, member states have worked to make enhanced
cooperation more feasible. The Treaty of Lisbon increases the opportunities
for diﬀerentiation – not least in the area of justice and home aﬀairs (oﬃcially
‘Freedom, Justice and Security’). As a counterbalance to justice and home
aﬀairs cooperation becoming fully supranational, a number of exceptions and
pause mechanisms have been introduced. These various braking mechanisms
are intended to meet the needs of the more hesitant member states.
With the drastic development of cooperation in this area, researchers have
discussed the extent to which – if at all – we see legal and political
harmonisation. There are, roughly speaking, two opposing positions. One
claims that state sovereignty, if understood as supreme political and legal
authority, remains a critical issue (Ladrech 2004). The other argues that
justice and home aﬀairs is driven by national oﬃcials’ desire to gain freedom
from domestic constraints and lift national policies to the EU level
(Guiraudon 2003). According to the latter view, the concern for sovereignty
has been replaced by a problem-solving agenda. As will become apparent,
this article sides with the latter position.
While the discussion on whether or not to join the euro has cooled oﬀ in
both the UK and Denmark, the debate on the opt-outs related to justice and
home aﬀairs and Schengen has become heated during the last decade. UK
and Danish ministers and oﬃcials are generally very keen to cooperate with
their European colleagues on these issues, while the Danish and British
populations are more hesitant towards handing over questions of national
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security to supranational institutions. The negative British stance toward the
Schengen border-free zone has been relatively stable since the 1980s when
Margaret Thatcher refused to remove the border controls toward other
member states. The British Schengen protocol has been ‘securitised’ to the
extent that it seems to constitute a guarantee of survival for the British
nation (Wiener 1999).
Consequently, the Schengen protocol is likely to remain in place for many
years. However, the ‘un-European’ Schengen exemption is presented
diﬀerently to the European institutions. The main argument put forward
to justify remaining outside Schengen is that it is only due to particular
practical (not political) problems linked to the UK’s status as an island
country; British oﬃcials and ministers always underline that the protocols
should not block further integration.12
In day-to-day politics, there are no watertight shutters between British and
EU policy in the development of common border policies (Adler-Nissen 2009).
Despite the Schengen protocol, the UK has adapted its national legislation
regarding, for instance, biometrics in passports to conform to EU standards.
Few of these changes have been visible to the general public; however, from
the idea of ‘safe countries’ to mutual recognition, the UK is trying to inﬂuence
and imitate EU measures at the same time (Geddes 2005: 734). In police and
judicial cooperation, British oﬃcials support a further intensiﬁcation of
collective EU measures to ﬁght transnational crime and terrorism, and press
hard for mutual recognition in both civil and criminal judgments.
On communitarised areas of ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ the UK has
a very ﬂexible protocol, which allows it to opt in on a case-by-case basis.
Former Prime Minister Tony Blair has claimed that the opt-in possibility
means that ‘unless we opt in we are not aﬀected by it and this actually gives
us the best of both worlds’ (The Guardian, 26 October 2004). Indeed, opt-
outs are also symbolic mechanisms that speak to the domestic population.
Particularly in the British case, the opt-in arrangement has been important
for the legitimisation of continued integration in justice and home aﬀairs.
Existing research argues that the British use of the opt-in possibility is
driven by the intent to shape EU policy in ways congenial to ‘domestic
interests’ (Ladrech 2004: 57). However, it is necessary to nuance the concept
of ‘domestic interests’. To understand how an opt-in decision is made, I
asked a UK Cabinet Oﬃce oﬃcial to explain the process:
First, we go for the ideal, which is to opt in right from the beginning,
because then we are full members and have full inﬂuence. The second
best option is to make clear that we would like to opt in eventually and
negotiate the condition for that to be possible. The worst case is when
we do not opt in.13
Opting in is risky, because the UK may ultimately be bound by legislation
that it does not like. For British oﬃcials, however, it is frustrating not to opt
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in. Today, the UK seeks to opt in to as much as possible; only the right to
maintain border controls remains a non-negotiable element in the national
position. The following response from Tony Blair to the criticism of his
choice to opt in to a particular measure illustrates how the notion of
sovereignty originally attached to the British protocol is confused:
But it is our complete choice as to whether to opt in; we might as well
say that about any measure in Europe [ . . . ]. Obviously, once we opt
in, that is presumably because we have decided that it is in our
interests to do so. Only the Conservative party could say that a
decision whether to opt in is somehow a negation of our sovereignty;
surely, it is the expression of it.14
Blair’s choice of words is revealing because national sovereignty and
integration have ceased to be oppositional terms: it is by opting in that the
UK performs its sovereignty. Moreover, Blair claims to speak on behalf of a
domestic audience (a ‘we’), but parliamentary and popular protests against
speciﬁc opt-in and opt-out decisions have not had any considerable eﬀect on
the government’s decisions.
While the British opt-in possibility provides its government with an
attractive a` la carte menu with surprisingly few domestic and legal
restrictions, the Danish opt-outs are constructed to tie the hands of the
Danish government and do not provide Denmark with an opt-in
possibility. Danish asylum and refugee policy is stricter than that of
the rest of the EU concerning rules on family reuniﬁcation and
requirements of attachment to Denmark. For the right-wing politicians
currently in power and the parts of the Danish electorate supporting
them, Danish rules on asylum and immigration constitute important
barriers to the much-discussed inﬂow of immigrants, asylum seekers,
criminals and terrorists. According to the inﬂuential right-wing Danish
People’s Party, a removal of the opt-outs will lead to a removal of these
barriers, which, according to this party is highly undesirable. The
People’s Party will ‘ﬁght to ensure that refugee and immigration policy
remains an area where Parliament is sovereign’.15 In the domestic debate,
the opt-out reaﬃrms the boundary between the inside and outside of the
state and locates national sovereignty with parliament.
However, serving the symbolic purpose of legitimising EU membership to
the Danish population, the exemption from cooperation on immigration,
asylum and civil law is presented diﬀerently in Brussels. On a day-to-day
basis, the opt-out has very little to do with grandiose symbols of national
autonomy. As with the UK, Denmark is far from a reluctant player in this
important policy area despite its opt-out status. Danish government and
oﬃcials are careful not to provoke the Commission and refer to the opt-outs
as ‘temporary measures’ or ‘minor technical problems’ to allow for
involvement in policies covered by the opt-outs.16 They work within the
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doxa of European integration and are convinced of its concrete legal and
practical beneﬁts.
Moreover, the Danish government seeks to align its policies with those of
the EU. As Denmark does not have the opt-in possibility, the Danish
government has applied to the European Commission for intergovern-
mental parallel agreements associating Denmark with legislative measures
under the former Title IV TEC (asylum, immigration and civil law) where
the Danish opt-out applies. This strategy is unknown to most of the public
and while it is a legally defensible practice, one could argue that it represents
a political bypassing of the protocol. In practice, Denmark adjusts its
domestic legislation via parallel agreements ‘which are considered [of] vital
interest to the country’ (Vedsted-Hansen 2004: 67). Yet former Danish
Minister of Justice, Lene Espersen argued in the Danish Parliament that the
agreements were concluded to secure ‘the common interest of the EU and
Denmark’.17 In Espersen’s exposition, the sovereign choice to conclude
parallel agreements is located both in Copenhagen and Brussels. Thus, she
eliminates the distinction between the national and the European sphere.
According to the Commission, the following conditions apply if Denmark
is to be granted a parallel agreement:
. Parallel agreements can only be of an exceptional and transitional
nature.
. Such an interim solution should also only be accepted if the participation
of Denmark is fully in the interest of the community and its citizens.
. The long-term solution is for Denmark to give up its protocol on justice
and home aﬀairs.18
The conditionality built into the parallel agreements function as a
disciplining mechanism whereby Denmark promises to get rid of its
disputed exemptions in the near future. In this sense, the opt-out no longer
guarantees autonomy as it is transformed into a sort of delay-action device.
The Danish political and administrative elites promise to work actively
toward lifting the opt-outs ‘in a few years’ and continuously assert that they
are just waiting for the right moment to call a referendum.19 Conceived
initially as a sovereign guarantee for ‘immunity from disliked European
legislation’ (Wallace 1997: 682), the management of these ‘guarantees’
reﬂects that member state representatives work within the doxa of European
integration, thereby undermining the original intentions behind the opt-out.
Conclusion: Sovereignty and the Illusion of Diﬀerentiated Integration
Most scholars believe that integration and opt-outs are unnatural and rather
uncomfortable European bedfellows. Thus, opt-outs continue to be seen as
paradigmatic expressions of national sovereignty and hence democracy,
reﬂecting what Neil Walker refers to as an ‘ideological assumption of
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ultimate authority over the internal operation of the polity’ (Walker 2003:
26). However, it is problematic to focus strictly on their original motivation,
and the way opt-outs seem to express a principled claim to national
sovereignty. Existing approaches to European integration – whether they
belong in the anti- or pro-diﬀerentiation camp – ignore that even the opt-out
state operates within the EU’s constitutional discourse. Indeed, the
paradoxical and perhaps most perplexing discovery is that the management
of opt-outs contributes to the upholding of the doxa of ‘an ever closer
Union’.
Building on the political sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, this article has
promoted an argument that zooms in on the everyday management of
sovereignty claims. I have proposed a distinction between the constitutive,
regulative and practice dimensions of sovereignty, focusing on the latter in
an analysis of the day-to-day reinterpretation and management of British
and Danish opt-outs. These opt-outs represent a crucial case of
diﬀerentiated integration, constituting the most extreme version of opt-outs
that currently exist for member states. I have shown that the opt-out
protocols are somewhat undermined in order to allow the UK and Denmark
to participate in the integration process as much as possible. Of course, this
does not mean that diﬀerentiation will never lead to disintegration, but it
does suggests that rather than fragmenting the Union, opt-outs conﬁrm the
objective of continued integration.
Theoretically, this aﬀects the way we understand not only opt-outs and
claims to sovereignty, but also the European integration process, interpreted
as a social integration of politico-administrative elites. At ﬁrst sight, opt-
outs might appear to undermine the solidarity and cohesiveness of the EU;
however, the diplomatic and legal repair work of the opt-out countries’
agents contribute to securing the doxa of the EU, undermining the initial
sovereign claim implied in the opt-out. While opt-outs were originally
presented to the British and Danish publics as clear political and legal
choices, they should rather be seen as ambiguous populist indulgences.
Where does that leave the current debate on European integration and
sovereignty? Opt-outs and other forms of diﬀerentiated integration have
come to be seen not only as pragmatic instruments to solve stalemates, but
also as solutions to problems of legitimacy and governance beyond the state
(e.g. Scharpf 2006). Yet both the orthodox anti-diﬀerentiation camp and the
pragmatic pro-diﬀerentiation camp have underestimated the symbolic
power of EU law and the intense socialisation of national oﬃcials within
a doxa of integration, which supports the EU’s own claim to supreme
authority and unity rather than the member states’ claims to sovereignty.
While proponents of diﬀerentiated integration have fruitfully analysed the
social context of EU law (e.g. Shaw 1996), they tend to disregard the
practices surrounding the rules. Instead of fragmenting the Union, opt-outs
have permitted a deepening of the integration process through increasingly
demanding treaties, even though not all governments (or populations) were
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fully on board. Consequently, diﬀerentiated integration is not a threat to the
notion of ‘an ever closer Union’ but – as a matter of practice – an innovation
quite consistent with the doxa of integration.
Diﬀerentiation can promote integration processes in situations where one
or more member states are blocking progress, but it does not solve the
democratic challenges currently facing the member states and the EU as
such. The French and Dutch ‘non’ and ‘nee’ to the EU’s Constitutional
Treaty in 2005 were at ﬁrst sight the exercise of sovereign will, but they also
came to signify a crisis of democracy. Despite the rejection of the
Constitutional Treaty, the treaty survives almost untouched with the new
and less controversial label of the Lisbon Treaty. It took almost a decade to
reach agreement on this Treaty while the level of popular scepticism has
grown. It was only by granting political guarantees or opt-outs – concerning
neutrality, taxation and abortion – that the Irish approved the Lisbon
Treaty in a second referendum. History appears to repeat itself. When the
Irish rejected the Treaty of Nice in 2001, they were asked to take the treaty
to another vote, though with guarantees for their neutrality and restrictive
abortion legislation.
If sovereignty is expressed in the form of referenda and opt-outs from
treaties, and yet in practice leads to integration in much the same way as
with all other policy areas where there is no opt-out, then the whole
legitimising ediﬁce of intergovernmentalism and diﬀerentiation is pulled
down. As ‘accountable’ (Scharpf 2006: 860), ‘neo-medieval’ (Zielonka 2006:
9) or ‘post-modern’ (Plattner 2003: 54) as they may be, measures of
diﬀerentiation such as opt-outs are not applied in a space devoid of tacit
understandings. Consequently, institutional entrepreneurs should consider
the social site in which they seek to construct new governance architecture in
the EU. As long as the doxa in the EU polity is not addressed, the eﬀects of
diﬀerentiated integration will be limited. Treaty-based diﬀerentiation is one
of the major reasons why Europe continues to integrate despite political
disagreement, enlargement, increased heterogeneity and popular euroscepti-
cism. This gives us reason to question how, and to what extent, the
sovereignty of EU member states is challenged in ways that their respective
governments have diﬃculty dealing with and explaining to their popula-
tions. Indeed, this article has shown that the symbolic weight of the opt-out
status is not matched by its practical use.
Of course, the doxa of ‘an ever closer union’ may still be fragile because it
is only fully shared by a small European elite. What has been socially
constructed, may – with the use of new reﬂections – be socially
deconstructed (Bourdieu 1993: 1454). New generations of heads of state
and government and their national representatives may enter the European
scene with a diﬀerent understanding of the purpose of integration, thereby
strengthening diﬀerentiation vis-a`-vis the orthodox integration mode. They
may ask new questions about which form of political rule is legitimate and
how popular sovereignty should be organised and regulated.
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Future enlargement rounds and negative referenda may impact on the
overall development of the EU. But this article suggests that ‘external
shocks’ and seemingly radical claims to sovereignty are transformed in the
engine room of integration. Drastic claims to national authority, even when
they are written into the fundamental EU treaties, do not automatically lead
to a change in everyday routines. For this reason, an analysis of the formal
or regulative aspects of sovereignty does not necessarily tell us much about
how sovereignty claims are subsequently handled. ‘In actual fact, opt-outs
constitute a de facto negation of the idea of European cooperation’, says
Guy Verhofstadt (2006: 214). In the light of the analysis presented here,
Verhofstadt’s claim needs to be revised: in practice, the management of the
British and Danish opt-outs indicates the strength of the idea of European
integration and the diﬃculty of practising national sovereignty in the EU.
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Notes
1. The case studies used in this article draw on Adler-Nissen (2008).
2. To lawyers who maintain a vision of the EU as a traditional international organisation, a
treaty opt-out proves that the EU is a classic treaty-based international organisation where
states remain ‘Herren der Vertra¨ge’ (see Allain 1999: 269).
3. The ‘Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland’, annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, lists the details of the British opt-out.
4. In 1997, the United Kingdom decided to participate in the Social Chapter and the
provisions of the protocol were inserted into the Treaty of Amsterdam.
5. Germany’s ‘banana protocol’, attached to the Rome Treaty (1957), is also controversial (see
Alter and Meunier 2006).
6. Interview, European Commission DG JLS (Brussels), January 2007.
7. Interview, UK Permanent Representation (Brussels), May 2006.
8. Interview, Cabinet Oﬃce (London), April 2007.
9. Financial statement, House of Commons debates, 22 June 2010.
10. Interviews, UK Treasury, April 2007.
11. Interview, Danish Ministry of Finance, August 2007.
12. Interview, Home Oﬃce (London), August 2006.
13. Interview, UK Cabinet Oﬃce, April 2007.
14. EU summit, House of Commons debates, 8 November 2004.
15. Danish People’s Party’s European Parliament campaign 2009.
1110 R. Adler-Nissen
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
et 
Kg
l B
ibl
 N
atl
 bi
bl 
og
 K
bh
 U
niv
 bi
bl]
 at
 04
:19
 03
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
11
 
16. Interviews, Home Oﬃce (London), April 2007; Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and
Integration Aﬀairs (Copenhagen), August 2006.
17. European Aﬀairs Committee, Danish Parliament, 9 February 2007.
18. European Aﬀairs Committee, Danish Parliament, annex 551, 31 January 2003.
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